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Learning from the Jeffrey Epstein Mess: It’s Time 
to Add a Cause of Action for Damages to the 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
By Tung Yin 
INTRODUCTION 
During the early 2000s, a wealthy financier named Jeffrey Epstein 
allegedly “assembl[ed] a large, cult-like network of underage girls . . . to 
coerce into having sex acts behind the walls of his opulent waterfront mansion 
as often as three times a day.”1  Local law enforcement officers began 
investigating Epstein in 2005 after receiving one complaint about molestation 
of a female teenager.2  As police attention focused on Epstein, more accusers 
came forward, and a horrifying picture emerged: “From between about 1999 
and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than 30 minor girls . . . at his 
mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, and elsewhere in the United States and 
overseas.”3 
Initially it appeared as if Epstein would soon face justice.  Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) agents began investigating him for child prostitution in 
mid-2006.4  That fall, FBI agents interviewed “potential witnesses and victims 
from Florida, New York and New Mexico.”5  By the following summer, the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida had 
drafted a 53-page indictment against Epstein for grand jury presentment.6  
Over the next few months, federal prosecutors and Epstein’s lawyers 
discussed a potential plea agreement, with United States Attorney Alex 
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 1.   Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump Cabinet Member Gave a Serial Sex Abuser the Deal 
of a Lifetime, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com 
/news/local/article220097825.html [https://perma.cc/7WFF-KY74] [hereinafter Brown, Deal of a 
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Acosta getting directly involved.7  Negotiations continued for nearly a year, 
with sticking points being Epstein’s objection to the appointment of a “special 
master to appoint an attorney to represent Epstein victims’ rights to civil 
compensation” and his unwillingness to have to register as a sex offender.8  
Finally on June 30, 2008, Epstein pleaded guilty in state court to two counts 
of solicitation of prostitution (one involving a minor), and the United States 
Attorney’s Office executed a non-prosecution agreement with respect to 
federal charges.9 
Pursuant to the 2004 Crime Victim Rights Act (CVRA), Epstein’s 
accusers were entitled, among other things, to “[t]he reasonable right to confer 
with the attorney for the [United States] in the case” and “to be reasonably 
heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving [a] . . . plea.”10  
Despite this statutory obligation, the federal prosecutors agreed to the defense 
team’s demand to conceal the non-prosecution agreement—that is, the fact 
that the federal government would not be pursuing criminal charges against 
Epstein as well as the terms of the agreement—from the victims.11  Epstein’s 
lawyer even memorialized the agreement to conceal in a letter to Acosta: “I 
also want to thank you for the commitment you made to me during our 
October 12 meeting in which you . . . assured me that your Office would 
not . . . contact any of the identified individuals, potential witnesses, or 
potential civil claimants and their respective counsel in this matter.”12 
Federal prosecutors not only failed to inform the accusers about the 
resolution of the matter, but also lulled them during the negotiations by telling 
them that “[t]his case is currently under investigation.  This can be a lengthy 
process and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough 
investigation.”13  As the Eleventh Circuit described it, “the government’s 
efforts seem to have graduated from passive nondisclosure to (or at least close 
to) active misrepresentation.”14 
 
 7.   Id. 
 8.   Id. 
 9.   Id. 
 10.   See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(4), (5). 
 11.   Brown, Timeline, supra note 2. 
 12.   Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1210 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (alteration in original). 
 13.   Id. at 1212 (alteration in original); see also United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78 (1962) 
(noting, in a suit against corporate defendants for fraudulent inducement, that false statements made 
after monies had been obtained already could be part of a plan “to make the victims believe that the 
defendants had faithfully performed and would continue to perform the promised services.”). 
 14.   See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated en banc, 967 F.3d 1285 (11th 
Cir. 2020).  The Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) reached a more 
charitable conclusion; while OPR stated that Acosta exercised “poor judgment” in resolving the 
federal charges against Epstein through a non-prosecution agreement, it also found that neither he nor 
any other federal prosecutors involved in the matter had committed professional misconduct.  
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As a result of this concealment, Epstein’s accusers missed their 
opportunity to speak at his state court sentencing hearing, not to mention to 
provide input to federal prosecutors about the non-prosecution agreement.  It 
would take a year of litigation, spearheaded by lawyers Paul Cassell and 
Bradley Edwards working pro bono,15 before the accusers would even learn 
the terms of the non-prosecution agreement.16  Cassell and Edwards would 
spend more than the next decade arguing that the United States Attorney’s 
Office had violated the CVRA, trying to undo Epstein’s state court guilty plea 
and the federal non-prosecution agreement so that the accusers would be able 
to speak at any resentencing hearing. 
Finally, on February 21, 2019—over 10 years later—U.S. District Judge 
Kenneth Marra found that the United States Attorney’s Office had indeed 
violated the CVRA.17  Moreover, this was not a violation stemming from 
negligence or an oversight, but rather a “decision to conceal the existence of 
the NPA [non-prosecution agreement] and mislead the victims to believe that 
federal prosecution was still a possibility.”18  The judge, however, limited the 
ruling to the violation, calling for the parties to meet and confer about “how 
they wish[ed] to proceed on determining the issue of what remedy, if any, 
should be applied.”19 
The proceeding before Judge Marra was still awaiting resolution of the 
appropriate remedy for the CVRA violation when federal agents arrested 
Epstein in New Jersey in July 2019; two days later, federal prosecutors in New 
York indicted him on new sex trafficking charges.20  While in pre-trial 
detention, Epstein tried to kill himself twice, succeeding the second time on 
August 10.21  Upon Epstein’s death, the New York federal prosecutors moved 
 
Ultimately, OPR concluded that “the victims were not treated with the forthrightness and sensitivity 
expected by the Department.”  Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pro. Resp., Executive Summary of Report: 
Investigation into the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida’s Resolution of Its 
2006–2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions 
with Victims during the Investigation at ix–xi (Nov. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1336416/download [https://perma.cc/HD6A-BRHU] [hereinafter OPR Report]. 
 15.   Cassell, a law professor and one of the primary forces behind the crime victim movement, 
had previously been a United States District Court judge.  See Paul G. Cassell, THE UNIV. OF UTAH, 
https://faculty.utah.edu/u0031056-PAUL_G._CASSELL/hm/index.hml [https://perma.cc/83ES-
JNZP] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 16.   Brown, Timeline, supra note 2. 
 17.   See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204, 1222 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
 18.   Id. at 1219. 
 19.   Id. at 1222. 
 20.   See Ali Watkins & Vivian Wang, Jeffrey Epstein Is Accused of Luring Girls to His 
Manhattan Mansion and Abusing Them, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-sex-trafficking.html [https://perma.cc 
/26ES-9EP4]. 
 21.   Shimon Prokupecz, Erica Orden, & Jason Hanna, Jeffrey Epstein Has Died by Suicide, 
Sources Say, CNN (Aug. 11, 2019, 9:03 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/10/us/jeffrey-epstein-
death/index.html [https://perma.cc/X45X-SSYD]. 
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to dismiss the case.22  Ordinarily, when a criminal defendant passes away 
before a conviction becomes final, the case should be terminated, and in many 
jurisdictions, even a conviction must be vacated if the defendant has not fully 
exhausted direct appeals before death.23 
Presiding over the New York matter, U.S. District Judge Richard Berman 
opted not only to hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss but also to invite 
Epstein’s accusers to attend and speak at the hearing.24  The resulting 
statements by the accusers and their lawyers continued for 58 pages of the 
transcript of the hearing, with 23 separate victims either speaking on the 
record or having written statements read into the record.25  Several of the 
accusers thanked the judge for providing them with an opportunity to be 
heard, notwithstanding the ultimate disappointment that Epstein had escaped 
justice.26 
Meanwhile, Judge Marra ruled on the remedies issue in the original 
Florida matter in September 2019, a month after Epstein killed himself.27  
Judge Marra concluded that Epstein’s death eliminated any case or 
controversy in the matter and therefore deprived the court of Article III 
jurisdiction over the requested remedy of rescission of the non-prosecution 
agreement.28  Judge Marra noted that “despite Petitioners having 
demonstrated the Government violated their rights under the CVRA, in the 
end they are not receiving much, if any, of the relief they sought.”29 
 
 22.   Dakin Andone, The Criminal Case Against Jeffrey Epstein Has Been Officially Dismissed, 
CNN (Aug. 29, 2019, 6:16 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/29/us/jeffrey-epstein-criminal-case-
dismissed/index.html [https://perma.cc/DY7N-QYDH]. 
 23.   See, e.g., Timothy A. Razel, Note, Dying to Get Away With It: How the Abatement Doctrine 
Thwarts Justice—And What Should Be Done Instead, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2196–99 (2007); 
but see Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 118 N.E. 3d 107, 109 (Mass. 2019) (reinstating NFL player 
Aaron Hernandez’s murder conviction after it had been vacated due to his suicide while appeal was 
pending on the ground that the doctrine of abatement ab initio was “outdated”). 
 24.   See Transcript of Hearing at 3–6, United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019) (No. 19 CR 490).  Two law professors had argued ahead of the hearing that Judge Berman 
should deny that opportunity because “there is no proceeding in which hearing from the victims serves 
a legitimate criminal justice purpose” given Epstein’s death and inability to respond.  Compare Bruce 
Green & Rebecca Roiphe, The Judge in Epstein’s Case Should Not Turn the Dismissal Into a Drama 
for the Victims, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 26, 2019, 11:00 AM) (available via Lexis Advance and Bloomberg 
Law) (arguing against victim impact statements), with Paul G. Cassell & Bradley J. Edwards, Hearing 
on Dismissing Epstein Charges Was Not ‘Drama’ but Proper Respect for Victims, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 28, 
2019, 9:27 AM) (available via Lexis Advance and Bloomberg Law) (arguing otherwise). 
 25.   Transcript of Hearing, United States v. Epstein, supra note 24, at 29–86. 
 26.   See id. at 26. 
 27.   Doe 1 v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
 28.   Id. at 1326. 
 29.   Id. at 1332.  One of the victims subsequently sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to order the district court to grant her requested remedies.  The 
Eleventh Circuit panel denied the petition, holding that the CVRA did not apply to pre-charging 
decisions.  In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1220 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated en banc, 967 F.3d 1285 (11th 
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The upshot is that Epstein’s accusers suffered horrific abuses at his hands, 
had no meaningful input into the prosecutorial decision-making, and lost their 
opportunity to speak at Epstein’s sentencing in the state court proceeding due 
to the government’s deliberate concealment of its agreement.30 
Notably, the accusers could not seek damages against the federal 
prosecutors or the United States itself because in its current form, the CVRA 
specifically rules out damages as a remedy: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize a cause of action 
for damages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or obligation 
to any victim or other person for the breach of which the United States 
or any of its officers or employees could be held liable in damages.31 
This Article argues that the CVRA should be amended to include a cause 
of action for damages for crime victims who establish violations of the non-
discretionary provisions of the CVRA requiring prosecutors to provide notice 
to crime victims of upcoming proceedings and dispositions and to include 
reasonable attorneys’ fees for such prevailing crime victims.  Part I provides 
an overview of the CVRA, focusing on the development of the “no cause of 
action” provision.  Part II turns to examine the traditional remedies for 
violations of the criminal procedure rights of defendants to show that when it 
is not possible to undo a violation, the remedy should seek to deter the 
government actor from future such violations.  Part III then argues that a cause 
of action for damages against prosecutors for CVRA violations would achieve 
the goal of deterrence without over-deterring them, and furthermore that the 
absolute immunity that prosecutors typically receive should not apply in this 
context.  Finally, Part IV argues that the cause of action should be 
accompanied by reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs, either as 
part of the Equal Access to Justice Act, or a separate provision. 
I. THE CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS ACT 
Traditionally, criminal litigation envisioned two parties: the prosecution 
and the defendant.  One court observed that “the actual victim was treated as 
 
Cir. 2020).  However, the panel opinion was vacated by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to rehear the 
petition en banc.  See id. 
 30.   I write “deliberate concealment” here based on the district court’s and Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinions in the matter.  Notably, the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility 
reached a somewhat different conclusion based on its investigation; nonetheless, even OPR recognized 
that the U.S. Attorney’s Office made a “decision to postpone notifying victims about the terms of the 
NPA after it was signed and . . . omi[tted] . . . information about the NPA during victim interviews 
and conversations with victims’ attorneys in 2008.”  See OPR Report, supra note 14, at xi. 
 31.   18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). 
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merely another piece of evidence.”32  One of the leading proponents of crime 
victim rights, Paul Cassell, once pointed out that the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure “substantively use the word ‘victim’ only a single time.”33  
Beginning in the later part of the 20th century, however, numerous states 
enacted laws or amended their constitutions to provide crime victims with 
rights such as advance notice of relevant proceedings (e.g., plea hearings and 
trials) and opportunities to attend and speak at such proceedings.34  This 
Section reviews the development of the CVRA from its inception to its current 
statutory language. 
A. From Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Statutory Right 
Despite state laws providing rights to crime victims, a 1998 study based 
on a widespread survey of crime victims “found numerous examples of 
victims not provided rights to which they were entitled.”35  Nearly half were 
not informed about the sentencing hearing for their perpetrators, and more 
than half were not informed that their assailants had been released.36 
Key proponents of crime victim rights such as Cassell, Douglas Beloof,37 
Laurence Tribe, and others, began advocating for an amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution to recognize a definitive role for crime victims in the criminal 
justice system.  The primary impetus for the proposed Victims’ Right 
Amendment was the perceived need to remedy the fact that existing laws 
regarding crime victim rights “have all too often been ineffective.”38 
On multiple occasions, Senators Kyl (R-Arizona) and Feinstein (D-
California) jointly sponsored S. Res. 3, which would have introduced a 
 
 32.   State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 170 (N.J. 1996) (citing Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s 
Against Victims’ Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 
8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 157, 158 (1992)). 
 33.   Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Proposed 
Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 835, 839 (2005). 
 34.   Id. at 841–42; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (holding that a state 
law permitting a victim impact statement was not unconstitutional, because it shows each victim’s 
“uniqueness as an individual human being”). 
 35.   See Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights 
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 509–10 (1999) (citing DEAN G. KILPATRIK, DAVID BEATTY & 
SUSAN SMITH HOWLEY, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., RESEARCH IN BRIEF, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME 
VICTIMS—DOES LEGAL PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 4 ex. 1 (1998) (defending the 
methodology of the survey)). 
 36.   See id. 
 37.   In the interest of full disclosure, Beloof was a colleague of mine before he retired from the 
Lewis & Clark law faculty. 
 38.   See Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, 
L.A. TIMES (July 6, 1998, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-jul-06-me-
1150-story.html [https://perma.cc/F52S-D9CJ]. 
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Victims’ Right Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.39  One member of the 
Judiciary Committee, Senator Feingold (D-Wisconsin), stated that he favored 
providing crime victims with additional rights and had voted for a state 
constitutional amendment as a state legislator, but raised several concerns 
about doing so at the federal level through a constitutional amendment: 
Issues related to crime are primarily the province of state and local 
governments.  Twenty-nine states have passed victims’ rights 
amendments and every state has enacted statutes protecting victims . . . . 
. . . I simply do not believe it is necessary to turn to a constitutional 
amendment when we have not yet tried to address the problems with a 
workable and enforceable statute . . . . 
A statutory approach . . . would not present the potential of expanding 
victims [sic] rights at the expense of narrowing the rights of other 
citizens, including criminal defendants, which this constitutional 
amendment plainly does.40 
Feingold’s concerns were shared by enough others that the momentum behind 
the proposed Victim Rights’ Amendment shifted to a statutory version, the 
Crime Victim Rights Act of 2003.41 
As enacted, the CVRA contains six sections that collectively enumerate 
the rights to be afforded crime victims in federal court, obligate prosecutors 
to make “best efforts” to notify crime victims of their rights, and provide an 
enforcement mechanism through a writ of mandamus.42 
Several rights are procedural ones.  Crime victims are entitled to notice 
of court or parole proceedings pertaining to the crime or the release or escape 
of the accused, to be heard at court proceedings involving pleas, sentencing, 
or release, and generally to not be excluded from trial proceedings.43  There 
are also substantive rights “to be reasonably protected from the accused” and 
“to full and timely restitution as provided [by] law.”44 
The enforcement mechanism of the CVRA consists of requiring the 
district court to “take up and decide any motion asserting a victim’s right 
forthwith” as well as permitting an aggrieved victim to seek a writ of 
mandamus from the court of appeals, which has a maximum of three days to 
 
 39.   See A Bill Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to Protect the 
Rights of Crime Victims: Hearing on S.J. Res. 3 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
(1999) [hereinafter Hearing on S.J. Res. 3]. 
 40.   Id. at 74–77 (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold). 
 41.   See S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 42.   See 18 U.S.C. § 3771. 
 43.   Id. § 3771(a). 
 44.   Id. § 3771(a)(1), (6). 
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render a decision, with up to an additional five days in which the district 
court’s proceedings can be stayed.45  While this mechanism may seem robust, 
it has at times been interpreted in ways that have “eviscerated the appellate 
protections promised to crime victims.”46 
Finally, as noted in the introduction, the CVRA also contains a provision 
that explicitly bars crime victims from seeking damages for violations of the 
act.47 
B. The “No Cause of Action” Provision 
The “no cause of action” provision came straight from the proposed 
Victims’ Rights Amendment.48  The earliest version of the proposed 
amendment in 1996 made no mention of damages, but lead sponsors Senators 
Kyl (R-Arizona) and Feinstein (D-California) each stated at a hearing that 
they were not intending to create a new cause of action.49  Feinstein, in 
particular, wanted to ensure “that prosecutors and other government officials 
[would] not be subject to costly lawsuits for monetary damages for, for 
example, the failure to give a victim notice of a particular proceeding.”50 
Later that year, Kyl and Feinstein introduced a new version of the 
Victims’ Rights Amendment that contained a “no cause of action” provision: 
SECTION 2. The victim shall have standing to assert the rights 
established by this article; however, nothing in this article shall provide 
grounds for the victim to challenge a charging decision or a conviction, 
obtain a stay of trial, or compel a new trial; nor shall anything in this 
article give rise to a claim for damages against the United States, a State, 
a political subdivision, or a public official; nor shall anything in this 
article provide grounds for the accused or convicted offender to obtain 
any form of relief.51 
 
 45.   Id. § 3771(d)(3). 
 46.   Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims in Federal Appellate Courts: The Need to Broadly 
Construe the Crime Victims’ Rights Act’s Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 599, 599–600 
(2010). 
 47.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). 
 48.   See S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).  
 49.   A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish a Bill of Rights for Crime Victims: 
Hearing on S.J. Res. 52 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 13 (1996) [hereinafter 
Hearing on S.J. Res. 52] (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); id. at 22 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) 
(stating that the victim’s rights would be limited to attendance at trial and to being heard at “sentencing, 
the acceptance of previously-negotiated plea bargains, and a release from custody” and that victim’s 
rights would be vindicated “by obtaining court orders to enforce them”). 
 50.   Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment to Provide Rights for Victims of Crime: Hearing 
on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 16 (1996) 
[hereinafter Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174] (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein). 
 51.   S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996). 
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Subsequent iterations of the Victims’ Rights Amendment have all included 
this provision or a variation on it,52 carrying over to the 2004 bill that 
eventually became the CVRA.53 
Senators Kyl and Feinstein discussed most provisions in the proposed 
CVRA, but curiously they had nothing to say about the “no cause of action” 
provision.54  Another co-sponsor of the bill, Senator Leahy (D-Vermont), 
blamed the opposition party, stating “the Republican sponsors of the bill did 
not want to provide for damages.”55  Senator Hatch (R-Utah) confirmed his 
support for the “no cause of action” provision: 
For those who may be concerned that this bill might lead to new tort 
causes of action, let me assure you, that victims are not seeking to sue 
the government and get rich.  All the victims want is a chance to 
participate in the criminal justice process.  Accordingly, the bill states 
that there will be no cause of action for damages.56 
There was no serious effort to eliminate the “no cause of action” provision, 
and, as noted earlier, as enacted the CVRA included such a provision. 
There are a number of factors behind the lack of strong support for a 
damages remedy.  First was a lack of vision (or desire for conformity), as 
evidenced by a Senate Report noting that many state crime victim rights laws 
had “[s]imilar limiting language barring damages actions,” suggesting that 
there was no “consensus . . . in support of such a provision in a Federal 
amendment.”57 
Second was the combined opposition of prosecution groups, law 
enforcement leaders, the Clinton Justice Department, and President Clinton 
himself.  For example, one early supporter of a crime victim rights 
amendment was Rhode Island Attorney General Jeffrey Pine, who relayed 
general concerns that such an amendment “not create a private right of action 
for damages against a prosecutor or other State or local official who makes a 
 
 52.   S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); H.J. Res. 71, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Victims’ Rights 
Constitutional Amendment Implementation Act of 1997, H.R. 1322, 105th Cong. § 2(c)(4); S.J. Res. 
44, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); H.J. Res. 64, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); 
S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002); H.J. Res. 91, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002); S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. § 
3 (2003). 
 53.   S. 2329, 108th Cong. § 3771(d)(6) (2004); H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. § 3771(d)(6) (2004); 
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 § 3771(d)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). 
 54.   150 CONG. REC. S4267–70 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004). 
 55.   Id. at S4271–72. 
 56.   Id. at S4278. 
 57.   S. REP. NO. 106-254, at 40 (2000); see also DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & 
STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 711 (2d ed. 2006) (“The victims’ rights laws of 
the vast majority of jurisdictions ban any civil cause of action for money damages against the 
government or courts for failure to notify the victim of or comply with victim’s rights.”). 
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good-faith attempt to comply with its provisions.”58 
The National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) and the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) both opposed crime victim rights 
laws that would impact prosecutorial discretion.  The NDAA thus urged that 
“[t]he abridgment of any right of the victim shall not be a cause for liability 
or a cause for injunctive relief which affects the ability for the prosecutor to 
effectively move the case forward to full disposition.”59  Similarly, the NAAG 
called for barring “damage suits against government officials and agencies 
and limitations on injunctive relief regarding matters where prosecutorial or 
judicial discretion is vital to the operation of an effective criminal justice 
system.”60 
Also supporting crime victim rights in general but opposing damages was 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, which stated that it did “not 
wish to allow delays in the swift administration of justice, or the creation of 
civil or criminal liability for failure to protect the victims’ or their survivors’ 
rights.”61 
President Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet Reno, expressed her view 
that the right balance between victims’ rights and prosecutorial discretion was 
“allowing victims to bring injunctive and declaratory relief actions—but not 
suits for money damages.”62  Clinton likewise was against a damages 
provision, according to Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt, who 
testified that the President believed “[v]ictims and their advocates are not in 
this for money, but for justice.”63  The transition of the White House from Bill 
Clinton to George W. Bush did not lead to a different viewpoint from the 
Justice Department; Viet D. Dinh, Assistant Attorney General for the Office 
of Legal Policy of the U.S. Department of Justice under the latter, stated: 
We would oppose any new cause of action that would be detrimental to 
our prosecutors and detrimental to the efficient management of the 
 
 58.   Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174, supra note 50, at 52 (statement of Jeffrey B. 
Pine, Att’y Gen., State of Rhode Island). 
 59.   Proposals to Provide Rights to Victims of Crime: Hearing on H.J. Res. 71 and H.R. 1322 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 73 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on H.J. Res. 71 
and H.R. 1322] (prepared statement of Hon. Joseph R. Weisberger, C.J., Sup. Ct. of Rhode Island, on 
behalf of the Conf. of C.J.J., Appendix C: Nat’l Dist. Att’y Ass’n, Resolution: Federal Constitutional 
Victim Rights Amendment). 
 60.   Id. at 49 (prepared statement of Hon. Joseph R. Weisberger, C.J., Sup. Ct. of Rhode Island, 
on behalf of the Conf. of C.J.J.) (quoting NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GENERAL, STAFF ANALYSIS: 
PROPOSED CRIME VICTIMS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1997)) (emphasis in original). 
 61.   INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS 18. 
 62.   A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 132 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on S.J. Res. 6] 
(responses of Attorney General Janet Reno to questions from Senator Leahy). 
 63.   Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174, supra note 50, at 172 (prepared statement of 
John R. Schmidt, Associate Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice). 
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criminal justice system.  State and local prosecutors would also be 
adversely affected if this amendment could be used in such a way as to 
hold them responsible when a victim felt that his or her rights were being 
deprived.64 
He also hoped “that Congress, when considering any implementing 
legislation, will strive to minimize the difficulties that could arise if Federal, 
State and local prosecutors were unable to predict what their proper response 
should be in certain situations.”65 
On the opposite side of the aisle, defense-side advocates found little 
comfort in the “no cause of action” provision, arguing that courts would find 
a way to create remedies for rights that were violated.66  Ellen Greenlee of the 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) raised hypotheticals 
about crime victims who are not told about the release from custody of their 
perpetrators, who then go on to murder them; the only realistic remedy, she 
argued, would be damages against the police and prosecutors.67  She argued 
that “the Supreme Court frowns on rights without remedies.  That’s why it 
created Bivens actions for damages directly under the Constitution.  
Purporting to close the door on damages actions will simply force the Court 
to open another.”68  The resulting parade of horribles that she foresaw 
included diversion of law enforcement and prosecutorial time and resources 
to victim notification obligations and “the cost of processing the lawsuits by 
victims whose rights have been neglected, and the damages ordered to be paid 
out of public coffers.”69 
Elisabeth Semel of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers likewise feared that “the Supreme Court will reject an attempt by 
Congress like that represented here—to confer constitutional rights upon the 
people of this nation empty of any practically meaningful remedy for 
violation.”70  The American Civil Liberties Union’s Mark Kappelhoff echoed 
those concerns: “[c]ourts will be forced into the position of either 
manufacturing a ‘new’ remedy or simply acknowledging the right without 
 
 64.   Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Crime Victims: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 102 (2003) (testimony of Viet. D. Dinh, Assistant 
Att’y Gen. for the Off. of Legal Pol’y, Dep’t of Justice). 
 65.   Id. 
 66.   Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174, supra note 50, at 143–46 (prepared statement 
of Ellen Greenlee, President, Nat’l Legal Aid and Def. Ass’n). 
 67.   Id.  
 68.   Id. at 146. 
 69.   Id. at 145; see also Scott Wallace, Mangling the Constitution: The Folly of the Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, WASH. POST, June 28, 1996, at A21. 
 70.   Hearing on S.J. Res. 6, supra note 62, at 178 (prepared statement of Elisabeth Semel on 
behalf of the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws.). 
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providing any meaningful remedy”71 “[p]rosecutors, courts, and corrections 
officials will be likely targets” of “[m]assive litigation”; and “[l]awyers, not 
victims will be the largest financial beneficiaries under the Amendment.”72 
Against this array of skeptics and opponents of a damages remedy, crime 
victim rights advocates did not take a unified stand.  During the drafting stage 
of the amendment and subsequent statutory bills, several victim advocates did 
make the point that without a damages remedy, the rights would be left 
toothless.73  However, other victim advocates believed that a damages remedy 
would not be needed for effective enforcement of rights.  Robert E. Preston, 
Co-Chairman of National Victims Constitutional Amendment Network 
(NVCAN) and Co-Founder of Justice for Surviving Victims, argued in 
support of the Victims’ Rights Amendment that “voluntary compliance with 
victim rights appears to escalate when they are raised to [state] constitutional 
status” even though damage suits were not available due to explicit bans or to 
the absence of specific statutory authorization in eighteen of the nineteen 
states that had enacted such amendments at the time.74  One particularly 
influential advocate was Steven J. Twist of NVCAN, who drafted both 
Arizona’s crime victim rights amendment (the one state that provided a 
damages remedy) as well as an early version of the proposed federal 
amendment.  Twist testified that: 
I can speak on behalf of the movement.  Victims do not seek another 
cause of action for damages.  We do not want the right to file in another 
court yet another case, yet another matter to pursue for money damages, 
but these rights must be enforceable in the sense that victims must have 
standing, clearly understood and clearly preserved in the law, to simply 
stand before the judge in the criminal case and say, Your Honor, I think 
I have a right to be in the room when the proceedings go forward, and 
have the victim have the right to stand there and the judge listen and take 
action.  Standing to enforce the rights is critically important.75 
To be sure, it was unlikely that there were any victim rights advocates who 
 
 71.   Id. at 153 n.3 (prepared statement of Mark Kappelhoff, Legis. Couns., ACLU). 
 72.   Id. at 159. 
 73.   Id. at 81 (prepared statement of Rep. Donna F. Edwards); id. at 163 (prepared statement of 
the Nat’l Clearinghouse for the Def. of Battered Women) (“While the amendment promises much to 
victims, it provides virtually no remedies for victims whose rights are violated . . . .”); Rights of Crime 
Victims Constitutional Amendment, Hearing on H.J. Res. 64 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 43 (2000) (statement of Emmett E. (Bud) Welch, Member, 
Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation, Okla. City, OK). 
 74.   Hearing on S.J. Res. 52, supra note 49, at 43–44 (prepared statement of Robert E. Preston). 
 75.   Id. at 86 (statement of Steve Twist); see also Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174, 
supra note 50, at 243 (letter from Roberta Roper, Director, The Stephanie Roper Committee, Inc., to 
Rep. Hyde, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (suggesting that other remedies such as “requesting 
the trial judge to determine the right; relief by leave to appeal, certiorari, [and] mandamus” could 
adequately enforce victim rights). 
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actively opposed a damages remedy.  Rather, as Paul Cassell and John H. 
Stein of NVCAN put it: “Victim advocates expected that concession, and 
know we can live with it—since virtually all state amendments prohibit civil 
suits, and are enforced, where necessary, by actions for injunctive relief.”76 
A final likely reason for the damages exclusion is the absolute immunity 
that courts have accorded prosecutors for actions taken “as an advocate 
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”77  As a 
result, courts have dismissed lawsuits against prosecutors for violating crime 
victim rights under state law.78 
C. Recent New and Proposed CVRA Provisions 
The Epstein matter demonstrated that the CVRA was still lacking 
sufficient mechanisms to enforce its provisions.  Interestingly, there were 
statutory additions to the CRVA in the mid-2010s that would have made even 
more apparent that federal prosecutors needed to communicate the fact that 
they had negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. 
In 2015, President Obama signed the Justice for Victims of Trafficking 
Act into law.79  Section 113 of that act added a new right to the CVRA: to “be 
informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution 
agreement.”80 
Within months after Epstein’s death, two legislative bills to amend the 
CVRA emerged from the House of Representatives.  H.R. 4729 was 
introduced on Oct. 17, 2019 by Rep. Jackie Speier (D-Calif.) and named the 
“Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019” after one of 
Epstein’s victims.81  Meanwhile, H.R. 5658 was introduced on Jan. 17, 2020 
by Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz and titled the “Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
of 2020.”82 
Each bill would provide potential penalties or sanctions against 
government employees whom a court finds to have violated the CVRA.  The 
Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act would create a National 
Coordinator for Victims’ Rights, who would be empowered to “apply 
disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or termination from employment 
 
 76.   Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174, supra note 50, at 197 (1996) (Nat’l Victim 
Const. Amendment Network, letter to the editor). 
 77.   See Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part by Kalina v. 
Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997). 
 78.   See, e.g., Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658–59 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 79.   See Pub. L. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227 (2015). 
 80.   See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9). 
 81.   Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019, H.R. 4729, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 82.   Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2020, H.R. 5658, 116th Cong. (2020). 
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and delay of promotion . . . for officers and employees of the Department of 
Justice who” violate the CVRA.83  This bill also would amend the CVRA to 
provide prevailing plaintiffs with reasonable attorneys’ fees.84 
The Crime Victims’ Rights Act would create a Crime Victims’ Rights 
Coordinator, who would be empowered to hear complaints alleging CVRA 
violations by government lawyers, and would be able to assess punishments 
ranging from disciplinary referrals to state bars, to suspension or termination 
of government employment.85 
These bills demonstrate that at least some members of Congress 
recognize that the CVRA, as currently constituted, falls short of protecting 
crime victims’ rights, particularly with regard to notice of proceedings and 
dispositions.  What is interesting is that both bills attempt to put teeth into the 
CVRA by focusing the consequences of non-compliance directly on 
prosecutors by threatening their professional livelihood. 
II. REMEDYING VIOLATIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RIGHTS 
GENERALLY 
What would be the likely impact of authorizing a cause of action for 
damages against federal prosecutors who violate the CVRA?  To get a sense 
of how different remedies might take form, how effective they might be, and 
what drawbacks they might have, we can examine the various remedies 
available to criminal defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated. 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from being subjected to 
unreasonable searches and seizures—essentially, those searches and seizures 
lacking probable cause or lacking a warrant or a warrant exception.86  If a law 
enforcement officer conducts an unlawful search, in the process discovering 
incriminating evidence against a suspect, the primary options available to the 
suspect, if charged with a crime, are (1) move to suppress the evidence under 
the exclusionary rule;87 (2) file a civil rights lawsuit against the official;88 or 
(3) lodge a complaint with an administrative or regulatory review board, if 
available.89 
 
 83.   H.R. 4729 § 3. 
 84.   Id. § 2(3)(F)(9). 
 85.   H.R. 5658 § 3. 
 86.   U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 87.   See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–51 (1961). 
 88.   See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against local police officers); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (against federal agents). 
 89.   See generally William Terrill & Jason R. Ingram, Citizen Complaints Against the Police: 
An Eight City Examination, 19 POLICE Q. 150, 154 (2016) (discussing the history of civilian oversight 
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A. Suppression of Evidence 
The exclusionary rule calls for suppression—that is, exclusion from 
trial—of illegally obtained evidence.  In Mapp v. Ohio, police officers in 
Cleveland forced their way into Dollree Mapp’s home despite her refusal to 
admit them, ostensibly looking for evidence of a gambling ring.90  She was 
charged with gambling offenses based on the gambling evidence they found, 
but she was acquitted.91  The government then tried her on obscenity charges 
based on pornography found in the search, resulting in a conviction.92  The 
Supreme Court reversed her conviction on the ground that the alleged 
pornographic material had been obtained through an unlawful search and 
therefore should not have been admitted against her.93 
Notwithstanding the common criticism that the exclusionary rule frees 
the guilty,94 one of its virtues as a remedy, according to its proponents, is that 
it restores the aggrieved party (i.e., the defendant) to the position that would 
have existed had there been no Fourth Amendment violation.95  If the police 
conducted a warrantless search pursuant to a valid warrant exception but 
lacked probable cause, then the prosecution should not have been able to 
obtain the evidence found as a result of the search; had the police sought a 
warrant, a judge would not have issued one.  Accordingly, the police would 
not have been able to find the evidence.  Either way, the prosecution should 
not have had access to the incriminating evidence. 
The important point is that the exclusionary rule does not make the 
prosecution worse off than it would have been in the absence of the Fourth 
Amendment violation.  The prosecution is still entitled to proceed with the 
case with whatever lawfully-obtained evidence it has in its possession.  This 
point is further confirmed by exclusionary rule exceptions such as inevitable 
discovery and independent source.  Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment will not be 
 
boards); Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police, 46 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1039–43 (2016) (describing the structure, function, and scope of civilian 
oversight boards). 
 90.   Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. 
 91.   Transcript of Record at 14–15, State v. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (1958) (No. 68326), 
https://clevelandmemory.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/law/id/3189/page/0/inline/law_31
89_0 [https://perma.cc/7Q2C-8FQ2].  
 92.   Mapp, 367 U.S. at 645. 
 93.   Id. at 660. 
 94.   See, e.g., People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (complaining that the defendant 
“go[es] free because the constable blundered”). 
 95.   To be sure, the defendant is not truly put in the same position as if the illegal search had not 
occurred.  The defendant may have incurred legal expenses in litigating the matter and may have 
suffered property damage or financial injury.  Those concerns, however, are outside the scope of the 
criminal trial.  They might be amenable to being addressed in a tort or civil rights lawsuit. 
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excluded if the prosecution can show that government agents other than those 
involved in the illegal search more likely than not would have found the 
evidence through lawful means.96  Thus in Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court 
held that the location and condition of murder victim’s body was admissible 
despite the fact that the police found it by violating the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights,97 because the record demonstrated “that the search parties 
were approaching the actual location of the body . . . and the body inevitably 
would have been found.”98  Similarly, the independent source doctrine ensures 
that the prosecution will be able to use evidence discovered through an 
unlawful search or seizure if, separate from the unlawful actions, the police 
obtained a search warrant, and the probable cause affidavit for the warrant did 
not rely on the unlawful search or seizure.99 
These two exceptions to the exclusionary rule ensure that the police are 
not put “in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or 
violation.”100  Or, viewing it from the perspective of the defendant, these 
exceptions ensure that the aggrieved party does not end up better off than if 
the violation had not occurred. 
Beyond restoring the defendant to the position where the illegal search 
had not occurred, the exclusionary rule theoretically also deters police officers 
from engaging in such unconstitutional conduct.101  Although deterrence was 
not a primary focus of the rule when first explicated by the Supreme Court,102 
it has since become the sole justification; where suppression of evidence 
would have no perceived deterrent effect on the police, the exclusionary rule 
is not to be applied.103 
Thus, when police officers obtained a facially valid search warrant from 
a judge, the prosecutor was entitled to use the fruits of the search even though 
another judge subsequently ruled that there was no probable cause to support 
the warrant.104  The Court reasoned that because “the exclusionary rule is 
designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges 
 
 96.   See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). 
 97.   Id. at 449–50.  The defendant, Williams, having been indicted, was represented by counsel, 
and thus under the rule of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204–06 (1964), any law enforcement 
interrogation in the absence of counsel was a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
 98.   Williams, 467 U.S. at 449–50. 
 99.   See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1988). 
 100.   Williams, 467 U.S. at 443. 
 101.   See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (citing Eleuteri v. Richman, 141 A.2d 
46, 50 (N.J. 1958)). 
 102.   See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–54 (1961) (discussing multiple reasons for imposing 
the exclusionary rule upon all states). 
 103.   See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (citing United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). 
 104.   United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925–26 (1984). 
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and magistrates,” the costs of excluding evidence due to a flawed warrant 
outweighed the “marginal or nonexistent benefits” of doing so.105  Similarly, 
when police officers conducted a warrantless search incident to arrest of a 
suspect, the prosecutor was entitled to use the fruits of the search even though 
a court subsequently struck down the criminal law that underlay the arrest.106  
As with the facially valid but still defective warrant case, the police had acted 
in good faith reliance on a duly-enacted statute.107  And when police officers 
relied on an existing Supreme Court precedent to justify a warrantless search, 
the fruits of that search remained admissible even after the precedent was later 
overruled.108  When it comes to the exclusionary rule, deterrence is the name 
of the game. 
B. Civil Rights Litigation 
Civil litigation is another avenue for potential compensation and redress 
of civil rights violations.  Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person who has been 
subjected to an unlawful search or seizure can also sue the responsible state 
actors. 109  The Supreme Court has read a direct private cause of action into 
the Fourth Amendment so that federal actors can be similarly sued.110 
A primary advantage of a civil rights tort remedy is that it can provide a 
more meaningful remedy for aggrieved parties who are not charged with a 
crime, and thus for whom the exclusionary rule obviously is of no benefit, as 
well as for defendants for whom the exclusionary rule is unavailable because 
there would be no deterrent value in applying it.111 
On the other hand, civil rights torts have their limitations.  A plaintiff who 
proves the violation of civil rights must also establish the damages suffered as 
a result of that violation.  Where the violation results in property damage, the 
plaintiff at least should be able to prove the monetary value of the loss.  For 
example, if, during the course of executing a search warrant, police officers 
fail to give the occupant enough time to open the door and instead break the 
door down, then they have violated the “knock and announce” requirement of 
 
 105.   Id. at 916, 922. 
 106.   Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50, 359–60 (1987). 
 107.   Id. at 360. 
 108.   Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238–40 (2011). 
 109.   See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] 
regulation . . . of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured.”).  
 110.   Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–
97 (1971). 
 111.   See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006) (pointing to § 1983 as an 
available remedy where the exclusionary rule was ruled unavailable for this type of violation). 
464 LEARNING FROM THE JEFFREY EPSTEIN MESS [Vol. 69 
the Fourth Amendment.112  The occupant could sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for the damage done to the door,113 the loss value of which would be easy to 
determine through repair estimates (though not likely to result in a large 
damages award).  A successful lawsuit based on a claim of excessive use of 
force could also lead to damages for medical injuries and pain and 
suffering.114  However, more psychic harms, such as “a gratuitous frisk or car 
search,” might be difficult to quantify and might not be valued by juries.115 
Apart from the issue of whether a civil rights plaintiff would recover 
enough damages to make the effort worthwhile, § 1983 claims have another 
potential drawback, which is that the threat of individual liability may over-
deter police officers.116  The individual officer gains little personally from a 
successful arrest and conviction but stands to lose financially if found 
personally liable; hence, a rational law enforcement officer might well avoid 
carrying out a lawful search out of a calculation that the personal risks 
outweigh the potential gains.  To mitigate the possibility of over-deterrence, 
courts have acknowledged qualified immunity for law enforcement officers 
sued for civil rights violations.  To overcome this qualified immunity, the civil 
rights plaintiff must show that the officer’s actions violated “clearly 
established law.”117 
C. Administrative Discipline and Regulation 
A final potential response to police violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights is to resort to administrative discipline and regulation.  A police 
department may have an internal affairs department to handle misconduct 
complaints and/or there may be an outside review board consisting of civilians 
to advise the department about such complaints.118 
As with the exclusionary rule, deterrence is the name of the game, with 
some scholars noting that “[p]olice regulation and discipline are generally 
directed at deterring police misconduct rather than compensating victims” and 
that “police training aims at avoiding Fourth Amendment violations before 
 
 112.   See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930–34 (1995). 
 113.   See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596–601. 
 114.   See, e.g., RONALD J. ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A. 
LIVINGSTON, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD & TRACEY L. MEARES, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
337 (4th ed. 2016) (stating that “[c]laims of illegal arrest and police brutality are more common” in § 
1983 cases.). 
 115.   Id. 
 116.   See infra Part III.B. 
 117.   See infra Part III.B. 
 118.   See, e.g., MARC L. MILLER, RONALD F. WRIGHT, JENIA I. TURNER & KAY L. LEVINE, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 396 (6th ed. 2019). 
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they occur.”119 
However, internal review boards may have limited final authority over 
discipline, as collective bargaining agreements may give law enforcement 
officers the right to seek review of punishments by arbitrators.120  Civilian 
review boards have similarly been criticized for “lack of disciplinary power, 
low funding, lack of subpoena power and . . . drawn-out investigations that 
regularly end with investigative findings kept confidential.”121 
III. DAMAGES AS A REMEDY FOR CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
In Marbury v. Madison,122 the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he 
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government 
of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, 
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”123  The 
CVRA nominally follows this directive insofar as it does contain a subsection 
on enforcement.124  However, the only actual remedy is a motion for relief 
(followed, if unsuccessful before the district court, by a petition for a writ of 
mandamus) to be able to assert the rights that were ignored or infringed.125  
Significantly: 
A victim may make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if— 
(A) the victim has asserted the right to be heard before or during the 
proceeding at issue and such right was denied; 
(B) the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus 
within 14 days; and 
(C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest offense 
charged. 
This paragraph does not affect the victim’s right to restitution as 
 
 119.   ALLEN ET AL., supra note 114, at 344. 
 120.   See, e.g., Nigel Jaquiss & Tess Riski, For Nearly 80 Years, the Portland Police Association 
Has Wielded Power in a Town That Doesn’t Like Cops. That Power Is Now Under  
Siege, WILLAMETTE WEEK (June 24, 2020), https://www.wweek.com/news/city/2020/06/24/for-
nearly-80-years-the-portland-police-association-has-wielded-power-in-a-town-that-doesnt-like-cops-
that-power-is-now-under-siege/ [https://perma.cc/9Z4H-LGTE]. 
 121.   See Everton Bailey, Jr., Portland Voters Will Decide on ‘Framework’ for New Police 
Oversight System in November, THE OREGONIAN: OREGONLIVE (July 29, 2020), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2020/07/portland-voters-will-decide-on-framework-for-new-
police-oversight-system-in-november.html [https://perma.cc/427G-8R62]. 
 122.   5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 123.   Id. at 163. 
 124.   18 U.S.C. § 3771(d). 
 125.   Id. 
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provided in title 18, United States Code.126 
This means that a victim who does not know about his or her rights and 
therefore does not assert them from the outset may end up with no actual 
remedy at all.  This, in fact, essentially describes what happened to Jeffrey 
Epstein’s victims (except that instead of a plea deal, Epstein received a non-
prosecution agreement), and perhaps explains why Judge Marra, despite 
finding a CVRA violation, had to request supplemental briefing from the 
victims and the government about possible remedies.127 
This Section considers the legal challenges involved in voiding 
agreements (whether plea bargains or non-prosecution agreements) and 
examines whether damages would be an adequate remedy. 
A. Problems with Voiding Agreements 
As discussed above, the primary remedy for Fourth Amendment 
violations is the suppression of the fruits of the unlawful search or seizure.128  
This remedy undoes the violation, and, if necessary, a new trial takes place (if 
the suppression is ordered by an appellate court following conviction).  If a 
crime victim is denied the right to attend a public proceeding in violation of 
the CVRA, then undoing the violation would entail enabling the victim to 
attend that proceeding.  If the proceeding has not yet taken place, the remedy 
is simple: reverse the order barring the victim.  This situation is contemplated 
by the enforcement provision of the CVRA: 
The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district 
court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no 
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the 
crime occurred.  The district court shall take up and decide any motion 
asserting a victim’s right forthwith.  If the district court denies the relief 
sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus.  The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a 
single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  The court of appeals shall take up and decide such 
application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been 
filed . . . . In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a 
continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing this 
chapter.  If the court of appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for 
the denial shall be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.129 
Thus, under this enforcement provision, the crime victim can assert the 
 
 126.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 127.   See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 128.   See supra notes 90–108 and accompanying text. 
 129.   18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). 
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right to attend in a motion before the district court, and if the district court 
denies the motion, the crime victim is permitted to seek a writ of mandamus 
from the Court of Appeals, with a decision coming within five days at the 
latest. 
What if the hearing or proceeding took place already and resulted in a 
guilty plea, or worse yet, an actual sentence?  Professor Beloof has argued that 
“[t]he superior remedy for failure to comply with victims’ rights is voiding” 
the result.130  What specifically is to be voided would depend on the particular 
crime victim right that was violated.  If the victim was denied the right to 
speak at sentencing, then the conviction should not be disturbed but the 
defendant’s sentence should be vacated with re-sentencing to take place in a 
new hearing in which the victim’s rights are to be respected.131 
But, as Beloof acknowledges, vacating a guilty plea is far more 
problematic, because double jeopardy protections circumscribe the instances 
when pleas can be voided against the defendant’s will to those in which the 
court lacked jurisdiction or the proceeding was a sham.132  Beloof does argue 
that the distinction between guilty plea and sentencing (for which 
resentencing following a determination of crime victim rights is permitted) is 
unjustified because the victim’s “interest in punishment is part and parcel of 
the right to oppose (or support) a plea or sentence.”133   
There have been more recent state cases on crime victim rights holding 
that the violation of a crime victim’s rights can result in a new sentencing 
hearing.  In State v. Barrett,134 the prosecution reached a plea agreement with 
the defendant, resulting in a guilty plea and a sentence of two years of 
probation, all of which took place in a hearing without the presence of the 
victim despite her invocation of state rights to be “notified in advance of 
sentencing and other critical stage hearings.”135  The trial court found that the 
state had violated the state’s crime victim rights laws but concluded that it had 
no power to order resentencing.136  The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that resentencing was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.137  
This ruling relied critically on the distinction between sentencing and 
conviction (whether by trial or guilty plea) because “[t]he Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific 
 
 130.   See Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and 
Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 301 (2005). 
 131.   Id. at 301–03. 
 132.   See id. at 305–06.   
 133.   Id. at 309.   
 134.   255 P.3d 472 (Or. 2011).   
 135.   Id. at 475–76.   
 136.   Id. at 476.   
 137.   Id. at 481–82.   
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moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be.”138   
Going even further was Antoine v. State,139 in which Maryland’s Special 
Court of Appeals ordered a trial court to vacate the defendant’s sentence and 
the trial judge’s approval of a plea agreement in order to consider the victim 
impact evidence, which the victim had not been offered during the original 
plea hearing because the prosecutor had advised the victim not to attend.140  
According to the court, if the trial judge were to reject the plea agreement after 
hearing the victim impact evidence, the defendant should be permitted to 
withdraw his guilty plea.141   
Antoine is an outlier insofar as it authorized vacating a plea after the 
defendant had been sentenced already.  Courts that have considered when 
double jeopardy attaches to a case resolved by guilty plea have tended to 
divide into those holding the plea itself triggers jeopardy and those holding 
that jeopardy does not attach until the sentence has been imposed on the 
defendant who pleaded guilty.142  Accordingly, the general consensus seems 
to be that, if a defendant pleads guilty and is then sentenced, double jeopardy 
would bar vacating the plea.  This means that the CVRA faces a hard limit in 
terms of when it can call for re-opening a proceeding to remedy a violation of 
its terms.   
Further complicating matters is the fact that guilty pleas or even deferred 
prosecution agreements can be wired to other conditions or obligations by a 
defendant.  That is, the agreement may involve more from a defendant than 
merely pleading guilty or accepting the terms of deferred prosecution in the 
instant case.  A defendant may have agreed to cooperate by providing 
information or even testifying against other defendants;143 or, as in Jeffrey 
Epstein’s case, agreeing to plead guilty to crimes in a different jurisdiction.144  
If an original plea agreement is re-opened successfully, that defendant 
potentially faces a worse result, as the judge, upon hearing from victims, may 
end up rejecting the deal, forcing the defendant to accept a less favorable deal 
or to risk going to trial.145  To forestall this very outcome, any defendant who 
pleads guilty not only in their original case but also cooperates with the 
 
 138.   Id. at 481 (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980)).   
 139.   226 A.3d 1170 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2020).   
 140.   Id. at 1177, 1193.   
 141.   Id. at 1193.   
 142.   See State v. Thomas, 995 A.2d 65, 73 (Conn. 2010).   
 143.   See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 
sub nom. Nelson v. United States, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988) (“No practice is more ingrained in our 
criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to 
the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that 
promises him a reduced sentence.”).  
 144.   See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.   
 145.   See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5).   
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prosecution or even pleads guilty in other cases can reasonably expect to rely 
upon the resolution of all of the matters.  Undoing the plea in the current case 
would upset such a defendant’s reliance interest in all of the cases.  If a 
defendant pleads guilty in other cases as part of the overall bargain, undoing 
the plea in one case would render that defendant’s guilty pleas in the other 
cases invalid.146  While it might be possible theoretically to put a defendant in 
the same position as before any of the guilty pleas, this would not be of any 
benefit to the defendant who has already completed part or all of the sentence 
or obligation.   
A deferred prosecution agreement is less likely to raise this problem 
because judges have very limited grounds for interfering with them.  At least 
one trial judge tried to reject a deferred prosecution agreement by refusing to 
pause the speedy trial clock, which would generally mean that the prosecution 
would not be able to resume the case in the event the defendant failed to 
comply with the terms of the agreement; however, the appellate court reversed 
and held that the district court lacked authority to reject a deferred prosecution 
agreement based on disagreement with its terms and conditions.147  Here, too, 
however, there may be situations where the defendant has already completed 
the requirements of the deferred prosecution agreement before the effort to 
undo the agreement.  In the Jeffrey Epstein matter, by the time Judge Marra 
ruled in 2019 that federal prosecutors had violated the Crime Victim Rights 
Act’s notice provisions, Epstein had long finished serving the sentence 
imposed by state court pursuant to his guilty plea there.148  Rejecting the 
deferred prosecution agreement at this late date would have retroactively 
rendered Epstein’s plea in the state case involuntary.149   
All of this is to say that undoing a guilty plea, deferred prosecution 
agreement, or non-prosecution agreement may trigger successful Double 
Jeopardy and/or Due Process objections by the criminal defendant, meaning 
that, even if statutorily authorized, such a remedy cannot be counted on as 
being available for every CVRA violation.   
On the very specific facts of the Epstein case, one can—and lawyers Paul 
Cassell and Brad Edwards do—argue that an illegal agreement should be 
protected by neither Due Process nor Double Jeopardy principles, because 
 
 146.   See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”).   
 147.   See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2016).   
 148.   Patricia Mazzei, Prosecutors Broke Law in Agreement Not to Prosecute Jeffrey Epstein, 
Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/us/jeffrey-epstein-
judge-prosecution-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/4QPQ-KCTR].   
 149.   See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 (1984) (upholding a defendant’s guilty plea 
because “it rested on no ‘unfulfilled promise’ and fully satisfied the test for voluntariness and 
intelligence”).   
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there are public policy reasons not to enforce illegal agreements, and without 
the contractual underpinning of the agreement, there would be no 
constitutional violation involved in rescinding a non-prosecution 
agreement.150  But such a principle would seemingly be limited to instances 
of direct collusion or worse, leaving the run-of-the-mill instances of CVRA 
violations without a remedy of vacating the guilty pleas.   
B. Damages 
That brings us to damages as a fallback remedy.  Upfront, it must be 
acknowledged that an award of damages is an imperfect remedy, one that 
typical crime victims would view as inferior to being able to undo the 
proceedings that took place without them.  One of the leading crime victims’ 
rights advocates testified in congressional hearings that crime victims did not 
want to file another lawsuit for money, but rather just wanted their day in 
court.151  Nevertheless, the operating assumption here is that undoing the 
proceeding is not available, either because the CVRA itself bars re-opening 
or there is a constitutional barrier to doing so.   
From the remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, we can see that 
when it is impossible to undo the violation completely (i.e., the illegal search 
occurred already), the dominant goal has become deterrence of future illegal 
conduct.152  Suppression of illegally-obtained evidence does have the effect 
of putting the government and the defendant in the same litigation position as 
if the unlawful search had not occurred, but that is a side effect, not the 
primary goal; under current doctrine, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
is not called for if there would be no deterrent effect on the police.153   
Accordingly, the CVRA—and in particular, the notice provisions—needs 
a remedy that would deter prosecutors from violating it.  There is, of course, 
no equivalent to the exclusionary rule that would apply to CVRA violations, 
 
 150.   See Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2’s Submission on Proposed Remedies, Jane Doe #1 and 
Jane Doe #2 v. United States, Case No. 08-80736, May 23, 2019, at 15–21.  See also Aleman v. 
Honorable Circuit Judges of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the Seventh Circuit 
held that double jeopardy did not bar the re-trial of a defendant who had bribed the trial judge in the 
original case to acquit him, because the defendant had never truly been in jeopardy.  To be sure, there 
is absolutely no indication that U.S. Attorney Acosta received a bribe, so the precise holding of Aleman 
is inapposite; however, its reasoning is consistent with the general thrust of Cassell’s and Edward’s 
argument.  The Seventh Circuit wrote, “To allow Aleman to profit from his bribery and escape all 
punishment for the Logan murder would be a perversion of justice, as well as establish an unseemly 
and dangerous incentive for criminal defendants.”  Id. at 309.  The same could be said to be true for 
Epstein; allowing him to work with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to conceal the non-prosecution 
agreement from the victims, and then to raise a double jeopardy bar to revoke the agreement, “would 
be a perversion of justice.”  Id.   
 151.   See supra note 75 and accompanying text.   
 152.   See supra Part II.A.   
 153.   See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009).   
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so the other remedies to consider would be damages and administrative 
discipline.   
Damages are a well-understood remedy; a defendant who is found liable 
for harming the plaintiff (whether in tort, contract breach, or property 
violation) is ordered to pay a sum of money that the jury had determined will 
compensate adequately for the harm done.  In instances where the harm 
suffered is financial in nature, whether from breach of contract or fraud, for 
example, an award of damages should fully compensate the prevailing 
plaintiff.154  Even for non-financial harms, damages are the standard 
remedy.155   
While the exact measure of damages needed to compensate for a violation 
of the CVRA may seem abstract and ethereal, it is analogous to the challenge 
of determining the amount of damages for deprivation of civil rights that do 
not involve physical injury or economic loss.  In Carey v. Piphus, two students 
sued under § 1983, claiming they had been suspended from public schools 
without due process.156  The Supreme Court held that damages for mental and 
emotional distress could not be presumed from a deprivation of procedural 
due process, but rather would have to be proven to have been caused by that 
deprivation.157  With that in mind, the Court noted that proof of the measure 
of such damages was a task well within the competence of courts, 
“foresee[ing] no particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and 
emotional distress actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process 
itself.  Distress is a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by 
showing the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the 
plaintiff.”158 
The key question then is whether the possibility of damages awards would 
deter federal prosecutors enough from violating the notice provisions of the 
CVRA without over-deterring them.  The analogous civil rights lawsuits 
under § 1983 (for state and local police)159 and Bivens (for federal agents)160 
have raised the prospect that a typical law enforcement officer will respond 
by scaling back searches so as to avoid being found liable for damages.  
 
 154.   Or not, considering that attorneys’ fees are typically not paid by the losing party in American 
litigation.  See infra Part IV.   
 155.   See, e.g., Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 73 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 
(1989) (observing that “the standard remedy for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is compensatory 
damages”); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010) (“An injunction is a 
drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of course.”).   
 156.   435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978).   
 157.   Id. at 263.   
 158.   Id. at 263–64. 
 159.   42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 160.   See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). 
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Professors Levmore and Stuntz explained that this would occur because “[t]he 
actors (police officers) receive no tangible reward for the marginal legal 
search or arrest, and are usually free to avoid acting altogether . . . without 
suffering substantial sanctions.”161  The result would be not only “fewer 
illegal searches . . . but . . . also . . . many fewer legal ones.”162  More recent 
empirical research on the impact that financial judgments have on law 
enforcement behavior suggests that the effect is difficult to measure but that 
some police departments do report that such fiscal liability “motivates them 
to improve.”163 
The Supreme Court’s solution to over-deterrence has been the creation of 
qualified immunity, under which public officials are liable for damages only 
when their discretionary conduct “violate[s] clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”164  
This standard, according to the Court, protects public officials by establishing 
an objective standard that is amenable to resolution on summary judgment 
before discovery, and hence “where an official’s duties legitimately require 
action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest 
may be better served by action taken ‘with independence and without fear of 
consequences.’”165 
To be sure, qualified immunity is not without its critics, and after a 
number of high profile police killings of unarmed Black persons (particularly 
George Floyd in Minneapolis), there were at least serious considerations 
among some Congresspersons and state legislators given to restricting or 
eliminating qualified immunity.166  As will be discussed later, prosecutors 
have enjoyed an even more robust form of immunity;167 for now, though, the 
relevant point is that the Supreme Court was concerned enough about public 
officials refraining from actions out of fear of personal liability that it created 
qualified immunity. 
The sorts of legal questions arising in the civil rights lawsuits in which 
 
 161.   Saul Levmore & William J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public Law: A 
Comparative Essay, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 483, 490 (1990). 
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 163.   Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 
UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1202 (2016); see also John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public 
Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1594 (2017) (“[T]he financial consequences themselves are 
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 164.   See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 165.   Id. at 818–19 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). 
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qualified immunity applies, however, are different from that when the CVRA 
notice provisions are violated.  One of the main concerns underlying the 
Court’s creation of qualified immunity was that public officials might 
otherwise be subjected to damages liability for discretionary actions that were 
not known to be unlawful except in the most general terms.  Thus, in Anderson 
v. Creighton, the Supreme Court explained: 
[T]he right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due 
Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates 
that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is 
a violation) violates a clearly established right.  Much the same could be 
said of any other constitutional or statutory violation.  But if the test of 
“clearly established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it 
would bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” that is 
the touchstone of Harlow.  Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of 
qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually 
unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract 
rights.168 
Overcoming qualified immunity thus requires that the plaintiff establish 
not just a violation of, say, Fourth Amendment rights in the sense that a court 
subsequently determines that an illegal search occurred.  Rather, the plaintiff 
would have to prove “that the circumstances with which [the officer] was 
confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances.”169  
While the plaintiff need not identify a prior controlling decision with similar 
facts, the plaintiff does have to show that “existing precedent . . . placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”170  This is a sufficiently 
demanding standard that the Court has conceded that qualified immunity 
protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.”171 
Thus far, the analysis has been premised on the assumption that the 
CVRA will be amended to allow a cause of action for damages against the 
prosecutor in an individual capacity, as opposed to an official capacity, or 
even a suit directly against the United States.  It is worth taking a brief detour 
to explain the validity of this assumption, and its ramifications. 
C. Identifying the Defendant in a CVRA Damages Lawsuit 
In an individual capacity lawsuit, the plaintiff “seek[s] to impose personal 
liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state 
 
 168.   483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
 169.   Id. at 640–41. 
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law.”172  Thus, the typical civil rights lawsuit against a law enforcement 
officer, for example, is brought in an individual capacity because the officer 
was acting under color of state law.  By contrast, an official capacity lawsuit 
is, in essence, one “against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”173 
One primary difference between the two is who pays: “while an award of 
damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only 
against the official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a 
damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government 
entity itself.”174 
Another difference is that the individual capacity defendant can raise the 
defense of qualified immunity, while the official capacity defendant cannot; 
but at the same time, a successful official capacity suit requires proof that “the 
entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal 
law.”175 
Applied to a claimed violation of the CVRA, this means that the lawsuit 
would most likely be against the prosecutor in an individual capacity, for that 
would be seeking to impose damages liability for the prosecutor’s decision 
not to inform the crime victim about upcoming proceedings, an action that 
necessarily falls under color of (federal) law.  It could be in an official capacity 
only if the particular United States Attorney’s Office had an official policy or 
a custom of not informing crime victims about upcoming proceedings. 
In practical terms, the difference between the two types of suits might not 
make an actual difference.  A federal prosecutor might—but is not entitled 
to—be indemnified by the Department of Justice.176  To be eligible for 
indemnification, the prosecutor’s conduct “giving rise to” the adverse 
monetary award must have been “within the scope of employment,” and 
further “determined by the Attorney General” (or designee) to be “in the 
interest of the United States.”177  Thus, if there were to be a cause of action 
for damages under the CVRA, a federal prosecutor cannot count on the 
government to indemnify the claim. 
Of course, in amending the CVRA, Congress could designate the 
appropriate defendant (whether the individual prosecutor or the United States 
Attorney’s Office) for a damages lawsuit.  An individual capacity lawsuit 
aligns with civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens against law 
enforcement officers and therefore might seem natural.  However, respondeat 
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superior liability is available in neither § 1983 nor Bivens cases,178 thus 
forcing the choice between individual or official capacity lawsuits.  Still, 
Congress could have created respondeat superior had it chosen to.179  Indeed, 
Arizona, which has the only state crime victim law that contains a cause of 
action for damages, makes the liable party the “governmental entity . . . .”180 
One compelling reason to follow Arizona’s example is that the crime 
victim will often not know who was responsible for failing to provide notice 
of proceedings or dispositions.  In the typical civil rights lawsuit, say 
involving an illegal search or excessive use of force, the plaintiff will 
generally know who committed the alleged wrong: the officer conducting the 
search or the officer using physical force.  Even when the victim of an illegal 
search or excessive force does not know the actual identity of the perpetrator, 
the victim can file the lawsuit against “Doe” defendants and amend the 
complaint to name the actual defendant after discovery.181  That is, the typical 
civil rights plaintiff knows that someone committed the constitutional 
violation; if there is any issue as to whom, it is one of identity.  This is true 
because the typical civil rights lawsuit is based on intentional action, not 
inaction. 
A CVRA notice violation, on the other hand, might be the result of an 
intentional decision, such as the one that then-U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta 
made to agree to the demands of Jeffrey Epstein’s lawyers to conceal the non-
prosecution agreement.182  Or a prosecutor might fail to give notice about a 
pending disposition due to oversight or carelessness, or it might be an office-
wide failure.183  The crime victim is not well-positioned to pierce the black 
box of the prosecutor’s office and unravel whether the failure to provide notice 
was malfeasance or nonfeasance. 
In a somewhat analogous situation, courts have recognized that proving 
corporate criminal liability can be a challenge because of a corporation’s 
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ability to compartmentalize information; as a result, “the knowledge obtained 
by corporate employees acting within the scope of their employment is 
imputed to the corporation.”184  Imputing all employees’ knowledge to the 
corporation for the purpose of determining the corporation’s mens rea thus 
removes the ability of a corporation to immunize itself from criminal liability 
by diffusing knowledge among different employees.  In the same way, treating 
the relevant United States Attorney’s Office, rather than an individual 
prosecutor, as the proper defendant removes the ability of the office to avoid 
CVRA damages liability by arguing that no one person caused the violation. 
Treating the United States Attorney’s Office rather than the individual 
prosecutor as the proper defendant has another important ramification in terms 
of the availability of attorneys’ fees for prevailing crime victims, as will be 
discussed below.185 
D. Prosecutorial Immunity 
Prosecutors sued in their individual capacity enjoy absolute immunity for 
most—but not all—actions taken as prosecutors.186  Such absolute immunity 
exists for essentially the same reasons that qualified immunity does.  
Permitting a cause of action for damages for violation of the CVRA’s notice 
provision, however, will not cause any of the problems that immunity is meant 
to obviate. 
In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court gave two main justifications 
for some form of immunity for prosecutors.  The first was that frivolous 
litigation could be used to harass prosecutors, and even if brought in good 
faith, could distract them and waste their time and energy.187  The second was 
that a prosecutor might make decisions based on the avoidance of personal 
liability rather than on professional judgment.188  These dangers, combined 
with the fact that prosecutors face particular risks of being sued because “a 
 
 184.   United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing 
Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1963). 
 185.   See infra Part IV.B. 
 186.   See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409, 420 (1976).  Whether absolute immunity should be eliminated in favor of qualified immunity is 
a question beyond the scope of this paper, but there have been calls to do so.  See generally  
Daniel Epps, Abolishing Qualified Immunity is Unlikely to Alter Police Behavior, N.Y. TIMES 
 (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/opinion/police-qualified-immunity.html 
[https://perma.cc/FKF4-LJCY] (describing the talking points for ending qualified immunity for  
the police, which are analogous to those of absolute immunity); Frederic Block, Let’s Put an  
End to Prosecutorial Immunity, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (March 13, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/13/let-s-put-an-end-to-prosecutorial-immunity [https:// 
perma.cc/DJR4-XX2P]. 
 187.   Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423. 
 188.   Id. 
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defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the 
ascription of improper and malicious actions,”189 made even qualified 
immunity inadequate.  Any § 1983 lawsuit against a prosecutor that survived 
a motion to dismiss would generate a wide range of factual and legal questions 
that “often would require a virtual retrial of the criminal offense in a new 
forum, and the resolution of some technical issues by the lay jury.”190 
The Court extended Imbler in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,191 in which a 
former prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against the district attorney and chief 
deputy district attorney for failing to train and supervise the trial prosecutors 
about the obligation to provide defense attorneys with material related to the 
impeachment of government witnesses, and for failing to create an 
information-management system to keep track of deals offered to government 
informants.192  Although the Court agreed with the former prisoner that these 
actions (or non-actions) were administrative in nature, it concluded that the 
chief prosecutors were still entitled to absolute immunity because the 
activities in question “necessarily require legal knowledge and the exercise of 
related discretion.”193 
In short, Imbler and Van de Kamp viewed the costs of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity—”leav[ing] the genuinely wronged defendant 
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action 
deprives him of liberty”194—as the necessary price to avoid the worse harms 
of distorting and distracting the prosecutorial decision-making process.  This 
reasoning is not surprising given the near total deference that courts have 
traditionally afforded prosecutorial discretion.  As the Fifth Circuit once 
noted, “[i]t follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, 
that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary 
powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal 
prosecutions.”195 
Judicial regulation of prosecutorial discretion raises concerns beyond 
separation of powers.  Courts have reasoned that they are not well-positioned 
to review discretionary charging decisions of prosecutors.196  If a prosecutor 
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 191.   555 U.S. 335 (2009). 
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 193.   Id. at 344. 
 194.   Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
 195.   United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 196.   See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379–80 (2d Cir. 1973) 
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elects not to charge a suspect with a crime, a judge would be hard-pressed to 
order prosecution; doing so would require the judge to second-guess the 
prosecutor’s decision on a number of dimensions, ranging from the priority 
given to different crimes to assessment of the relative strength of cases, all of 
which involve judgments about the appropriate allocation of limited 
resources.197  Courts are, according to the Supreme Court, simply not 
equipped to evaluate these sorts of decisions.198  For example, suppose that 
the local prosecutor has probable cause to believe that suspect A committed 
crime X and that suspect B committed crime Y.199  If the prosecutor opts to 
charge suspect A but not suspect B based on a judgment crime X was a higher 
priority than crime Y, how exactly would a court determine that the prosecutor 
should have made a different decision?200  The absence of judicial standards 
to resolve the matter becomes even more clear when one imagines if the judge 
were to determine that both suspects A and B should have been prosecuted; 
given the finite resources of the prosecutor’s office, such a judicial order 
might well have the effect of forcing the prosecutor to abandon the 
prosecution of suspect C for crime Z in order to free up the time to go after 
suspect B.  All of this after-the-fact scrutiny may have a “chill[ing]” effect on 
prosecutors and police.201 
In addition, judicial review of a decision not to charge would most likely 
require breaking “the secrecy of the grand jury” in order to examine the 
evidence available to the prosecutor; doing so would run afoul of the need “to 
protect the accused’s reputation from public damage based upon insufficient, 
improper, or even malicious charges.”202  Jurisdictions that use grand juries 
as charging mechanisms typically impose secrecy obligations upon the 
prosecutor and grand jurors (though not the witnesses) regarding the grand 
jury proceedings.203  Some of the reasons for that secrecy are “to encourage 
all witnesses to step forward and testify freely without fear or retaliation,”204  
and to protect the public reputation of the innocent who are investigated but 
 
 197.   See id. 
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not charged.205  To be sure, grand jury materials can be ordered disclosed by 
a court in certain circumstances,206 usually where there is some “compelling 
necessity.”207 
E. The Rationales for Prosecutorial Immunity Do Not Apply to Key 
Notice Provisions of the CVRA 
The CVRA imposes specific and discrete obligations on prosecutors or 
judges or both.  Three of the crime victim rights apply primarily if not solely 
to prosecutors by their very nature: “[t]he reasonable right to confer with the 
attorney for the Government in the case,” “[t]he right to be informed in a 
timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement,” and 
“[t]he right to be informed of the rights under this section and the services 
described in section 503(c) of the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 
(42 U.S.C. 10607(c)) and provided contact information for the Office of the 
Victims’ Rights Ombudsman of the Department of Justice.”208 
Of those three, only one involves an element of interpretation—”the 
reasonable right to confer” with the prosecutor.209  This right arguably risks 
interfering with prosecutorial discretion and decision-making.  One can 
imagine a situation in which a crime victim sincerely feels that there has not 
been a satisfactory opportunity to confer with the prosecutor, while the 
prosecutor sincerely feels that the victim has had a full opportunity to express 
concerns, expectations, and preferences.  If this sort of disagreement were 
subject to litigation in court, prosecutors might protect themselves from 
lawsuits by consciously devoting more time to victims than they otherwise 
would have.  While such an outcome would likely be welcomed by the 
victims, it would distort prosecutorial decision making in the very way that 
courts have sought to avoid through the immunity doctrines. 
The other two obligations imposed on prosecutors, on the other hand, do 
not impose any “reasonableness”-type of standard.  The most important 
provision is the one about notice of plea bargains or deferred prosecutions.210  
The crime victim is entitled “to be informed in a timely manner of any plea 
bargain or deferred prosecution agreement.”211  One might argue that “timely” 
plays a role similar to “reasonable” in the “right to confer,” and therefore 
litigation of this right would create just as much risk of interfering with 
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prosecutorial discretion and decision-making.  The CVRA, however, provides 
a specific context for understanding what “timely” means; notice of the 
government’s decision to end a criminal matter with a plea bargain or a 
deferred prosecution agreement is meaningful to the victim in connection with 
“[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district 
court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.”212  If 
notice of the government’s decision comes too late for the victim to be able to 
invoke the right to be heard in court, then it cannot be timely.  And in a 
situation such as that in the Jeffrey Epstein case, failure to inform victims of 
a dismissal agreement is no notice at all. 
In other contexts, courts have interpreted “timely” in similar fashion.  For 
example, a federal regulation required state agencies to “give timely and 
adequate notice” to welfare recipients before terminating their benefits and to 
refrain from taking such action unilaterally if the recipient requested a hearing 
within the timely notice period.213  The regulation further defined “timely” to 
mean “at least 10 days before” the effective date of termination of benefits.214  
The state agency in question passed its own rule stating “when the claimant 
files a request for a state hearing within ten days from the date that notice . . . 
was mailed, aid shall be continued, until the hearing decision in the amount 
that the claimant would have been paid if the proposed action had not been 
taken.”215  The effect of the state agency rule was that if the agency sent notice 
to its intention to terminate benefits more than 10 days ahead of the action 
date—say two weeks—the recipient would not be entitled to a hearing if the 
request was not made within 10 days, even though that 10 day period would 
end with four days remaining before the termination date.216  The California 
Court of Appeals struck down the state agency rule, holding that timely could 
not mean “at any time sooner than the effective date of the contemplated 
action.”217  In other words, “timely” should be defined in relation to the ability 
of the affected party to be able to respond. 
Similarly, the Second Circuit evaluated whether the government’s 
disclosure of Brady material was timely in relation to the defendant’s ability 
to use that material in his or her defense, concluding that “as long as a 
defendant possesses Brady evidence in time for its effective use, the 
government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law simply 
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because it did not produce the evidence sooner.”218 
“Timely,” thus, has a clear and ascertainable meaning, thereby avoiding 
the problems of after-the-fact second-guessing that justify prosecutorial 
immunity.  Compliance with the notice provision does not require that a 
prosecutor make judgments about where to deploy scarce resources (including 
prosecutorial time and money).  It is instead binary: the prosecutor either 
provides notice in time, or fails to do so.  In reviewing whether a prosecutor 
provided timely notice, a court would not be superimposing its own views 
about prosecutorial priorities. 
The other stated reason for keeping courts out of the business of 
evaluating prosecutorial charging decisions—the need to preserve grand jury 
secrecy—is simply inapplicable to litigation over a prosecutor’s alleged 
failure to provide CVRA-mandated notice.219  A prosecutor’s decision to offer 
a plea agreement or a deferred prosecution agreement, or even to drop charges, 
will depend on a range of considerations including the strength of the evidence 
against the defendant, at least some of which presumably would have already 
been presented to the grand jury.220  True, the judge might try to avoid 
reviewing grand jury material—and in turn, deny access to the same to anyone 
challenging the prosecutor’s decision—by simply examining the underlying 
evidence, not what was presented to the grand jury.  One can imagine, for 
example, that a key witness ended up being much shakier on the witness stand 
without even facing cross-examination, thereby leading the prosecutor to 
reassess the case.  How would litigation challenging the prosecutor’s charging 
decision be able to proceed without, at a minimum, a transcript of the grand 
jury hearing? 
In contrast, determining whether a prosecutor provided timely notice of a 
plea agreement or deferred prosecution agreement does not involve the grand 
jury hearing at all.  The notice requirement does not mean that the prosecutor 
must obtain the crime victim’s assent to the charging decision; thus, the 
prosecutor does not need to justify the charging decision and would not need 
to reveal any grand jury material. 
Providing notice is more akin to a ministerial act than a discretionary one.  
There are no balancing factors or competing interests to weigh; there is simply 
the obligation to provide notice.  No doubt there might be instances when a 
prosecutor would prefer not to provide notice to a crime victim out of concern 
that the crime victim would influence the judge to reject a proposed case 
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resolution, but such concern is simply irrelevant to the CVRA.  Accordingly, 
there is no professional judgment requiring immunity. 
IV. ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS AS AN INCENTIVE 
FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CRIME VICTIMS 
Access to legal representation remains a significant problem for many 
crime victims.  Adding a cause of action for damages and attorneys’ fees for 
plaintiffs who prevail in proving certain violations of the CVRA has the 
additional benefit of providing a greater incentive for lawyers to take on the 
representation of crime victims. 
A. Shortage of Legal Representation for Crime Victims 
Professors Garvin and Beloof have noted that currently “most victims will 
not be able to afford an attorney, and there is a paucity of trained pro bono 
victim lawyers.”221  Studies have found that “cost is a primary barrier to 
victims receiving civil legal services.”222  Given the correlation between 
poverty and crime victimization, with federal data showing that below-
poverty level households had double the rate of violent victimization 
compared to high income households,223 the net result is that those who are 
most likely to need crime victim lawyers are the ones least likely to be able to 
afford them.  In one high-profile multiple homicide case in Florida, the trial 
judge sua sponte ordered the appointment of counsel to represent the relatives 
of the victims; the judge’s reasoning was sparse, consisting of quoting the 
state constitution’s crime victim rights followed by a conclusory assertion that 
the relatives “are entitled to have an attorney participate in this case.”224  This 
case, however, stands out precisely for its uniqueness. 
Thus, the current state of the CVRA resembles that of the right to counsel 
for criminal defendants prior to Gideon v. Wainwright.225  Until that landmark 
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decision, the Sixth Amendment stood for the proposition that—absent special 
circumstances such as a Black defendant facing capital punishment—a 
defendant could not be prohibited from having a lawyer provide defense 
representation so long as the defendant could afford the lawyer.226  Those 
defendants who could afford lawyers (or find ones who would proceed pro 
bono) would get the benefit of qualified legal representation, while those who 
could not afford them would have to represent themselves.  The consequences 
of proceeding without a lawyer were severe, as the Supreme Court noted: 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no 
skill in the science of law.  If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or 
bad.  He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.  Left without the aid of 
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted 
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or 
otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.  He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him.  Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.  If 
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the 
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.227 
Not surprisingly, crime victims who have enough resources to hire their 
own attorneys are much better positioned to vindicate their rights.  For 
example, when Gert Boyle, then-Chairwoman of Columbia Sportswear, Inc., 
sought to enforce her crime victim rights against the man who attacked her in 
her home, she had her own lawyer.228  As a result, she was able to provide a 
victim impact statement even before the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted 
kidnapping.229  Many of Jeffrey Epstein’s victims also had legal 
representation; seven different lawyers made appearances at the hearing 
before Judge Berman in which 23 victims were able to speak before the case 
against Epstein was dismissed due to his death.230  Considering that it took ten 
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years of litigation to get to that point,231 one wonders what would have 
happened if the victims had not had the benefit of lawyers. 
On the other hand, those crime victims who are unable to hire attorneys 
to represent them must navigate the CVRA and the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure by themselves.  Of course, theoretically, a prosecutor should be 
available to help the crime victim, but, as the Epstein debacle demonstrates, 
sometimes the prosecutor is one of the parties obstructing the crime victim’s 
access to justice.232  While the stakes are admittedly different for crime 
victims compared to criminal defendants in the most obvious sense that only 
the latter face the state-imposed loss of liberty, the magnitude of the task for 
the lay person is comparably daunting in both instances.  While the crime 
victims do not have to be familiar with the rules of evidence, they would have 
to know about the existence of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
then to be able to understand them to know about the various critical stages of 
the criminal proceeding that they are entitled to participate in; and 
furthermore, they would need to be able to file writs of mandamus to compel 
the district courts to provide access that was improperly denied. 
Gideon v. Wainwright233 dismantled the too-narrow reading of the Sixth 
Amendment and guaranteed appointment of counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants.234  Crime victims do not have the benefit of a constitutional (or 
even statutory) right to counsel, so they are frequently unable to vindicate their 
rights fully. 
B. Prevailing Plaintiff Attorneys’ Fees 
In other contexts, Congress has recognized the importance of providing 
pecuniary incentives to lawyers to litigate civil rights lawsuits on behalf of 
plaintiffs.  42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action against those 
who deprive another of civil rights under color of state law, is accompanied 
by § 1988, a provision allowing courts in their discretion to award attorneys’ 
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fees to prevailing parties.235  An aggrieved party typically must also find a 
lawyer willing to take on the case.236  This means paying the lawyer directly 
(whether on an hourly basis or a fixed fee) or on a contingency basis, or 
finding a lawyer willing to proceed pro bono.  While contingency 
representation is common for tort plaintiffs, it is attractive only where the 
expected outcome (likelihood of recovery times the value of recovery) is large 
enough to warrant the lawyer’s time and effort.  Nominal damages are not 
likely to satisfy lawyers working on a contingent basis because a fraction or 
percentage of a nominal amount is an even smaller nominal amount.237 
Recognizing this problem, Congress has provided an incentive for 
lawyers to pursue civil rights litigation with uncertain or nominal damages: 
“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”238 
Although § 1988 does not distinguish between plaintiffs and defendants, 
courts have generally applied an asymmetric standard where prevailing 
plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to their attorneys’ fees, but “prevailing 
defendants are entitled to [their] attorney[s’] fees only” if the lawsuit was 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”239  This asymmetric standard 
favoring plaintiffs is “[i]ntended as an incentive for the private enforcement 
of civil rights,” and to encourage meritorious civil rights litigation.240 
Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits, 
among other things, racial and sexual discrimination in employment, contains 
the following provision: 
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or 
the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as 
part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be 
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liable for costs the same as a private person.241 
As with § 1983, the plain text of the statute does not distinguish between 
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants,242 but the Supreme Court in 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC noted that a prevailing plaintiff in a 
Title VII action “ordinarily is to be awarded attorneys’ fees in all but special 
circumstances,” but that a prevailing defendant would be entitled to attorneys’ 
fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation . . . .”243 
A comparable fee-shifting provision created by Congress is that contained 
in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  FOIA obligates federal agencies 
to make available to the public rules, orders, opinions, records, and 
proceedings upon request.244  However, FOIA also contains a number of 
exemptions that, if applicable, permit the agency to withhold documents that 
fall within a request.245  The person or entity requesting documents sometimes 
must resort to litigation against the agency (either because the agency refuses 
to respond or invokes an exemption).246 
FOIA violations share a quality with CVRA violations in that both do not 
involve direct financial harm or losses, but instead the deprivation of a 
procedural-type of right.  As with the civil rights claims, Congress created an 
attorneys’ fee provision for prevailing FOIA plaintiffs: “The court may assess 
against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs 
reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant 
has substantially prevailed.”247  In Kay v. Ehrler, the Supreme Court 
concluded that this sort of provision’s “specific purpose was to enable 
potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating 
their rights.”248 
Finally, one can look to the general federal statute on costs and fees 
whenever the United States is a party to a civil action, which was heavily 
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modified by the Equal Access to Justice Act.249  28 U.S.C. § 2412 states in 
relevant part: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award 
to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, 
in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by 
that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including 
proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against 
the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless 
the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.250 
Courts have set forth three requirements for a litigant against the United States 
to obtain attorneys’ fees under this provision: (1) the litigant must be the 
“prevailing party”; (2) the government’s position must not be “substantially 
justified”; and (3) it must not be unjust to award fees against the 
government.251 
Thus, unlike the fee shifting provisions of Title VII and § 1983, there is 
no presumption that prevailing plaintiffs against the United States will recover 
reasonable attorneys’ fees.  The Supreme Court noted that Congress, in 
requiring that the government’s position not be substantially justified, 
“apparently sought to dispel any assumption that the Government must pay 
fees each time it loses.”252 
While § 2412 is thus less generous to plaintiffs than the other fee shifting 
provisions discussed, it similarly seeks “to provide an incentive for private 
parties to contest government overreaching, to deter subsequent government 
wrongdoing, and to provide more complete compensation for citizens injured 
by government action.”253 
The final question to be answered is, in the event a crime victim proves a 
violation of the CVRA’s notice provision, who would pay the victim’s 
attorneys’ fees, the individual prosecutor or the United States?  The United 
States is obviously the deeper pocket, but the standard interpretation of federal 
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Circuit Dilemma for Asylum-Seekers, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550611 [https://perma.cc/JQ3X-SUV9]. 
 250.   28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 
 251.   See, e.g., Krecioch v. United States, 316 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Comm’r, 
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990)); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 765 
(11th Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 496 U.S. 154 (1990). 
 252.   Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 415 (2004). 
 253.   Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of 
Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 225 (1994) 
(quoting Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A Qualified Success, 
11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 458, 458 (1993)). 
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fee-shifting statutes is that the losing party is who is responsible.254  However, 
given the possibility (though not guarantee) of indemnification,255 there might 
not be a practical difference; the United States might end up paying either 
way. 
Still, given the advantages of permitting a cause of action for damages 
against the relevant United States Attorney’s Office, as opposed to an 
individual prosecutor,256 it follows that the Department of Justice (i.e., the 
United States) would be the appropriate party to pay attorneys’ fees.  In the 
absence of a specific fee-shifting provision like those in § 1983 and Title VII, 
this would mean proceeding under the Equal Access to Justice Act.  As noted 
above, the text of that statute demands more from a prevailing plaintiff than 
the other fee-shifting provisions.257  Here, however, the difference is not likely 
to be material because the prevailing (crime victim) plaintiff must have 
established that the United States Attorney’s Office failed to provide the 
statutorily-required notice.258  It is difficult to see how the government could 
argue successfully that it was “substantially justified” in failing to provide 
such notice. 
CONCLUSION 
Jeffrey Epstein inflicted horrendous suffering on his victims, and then the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, under the 
“leadership” of then-United States Attorney Alex Acosta, compounded the 
harm by negotiating a shockingly lenient non-prosecution agreement and then 
concealing the existence of that agreement from the victims.  After a decade 
of litigation, a district judge finally concluded that the Office had violated the 
CVRA; yet, because of Epstein’s suicide, the only meaningful consequence 
for that violation was that Acosta, by then the Secretary of Labor, resigned 
over his earlier handling of the Epstein matter.259 
The concept of damages as a remedy for CVRA violations is not a new 
one; the history of the drafting of the CVRA demonstrates that it had at least 
been considered at one point, but rejected for a variety of reasons.  What the 
Epstein saga has revealed, however, is that without a damages remedy, the 
CVRA is, as has been feared by some proponents, toothless and dependent on 
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 255.   See supra Part III.C.  
 256.   See supra Part III.D. 
 257.   See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text. 
 258.   18 U.S.C. § 3771. 
 259.   Annie Karni, Eileen Sullivan & Noam Sheiber, Acosta to Resign as Labor Secretary Over 
Jeffrey Epstein Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2019/07/12/us/politics/acosta-resigns-trump.html [https://perma.cc/8MLF-YNCT]. 
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voluntary compliance. 
The existence of a damages remedy (coupled with reasonable attorneys’ 
fees for prevailing crime victims) would prod prosecutors into complying with 
the simple notice requirements of the CVRA without overly-deterring 
prosecutors or chilling their decision making.  Jeffrey Epstein’s victims never 
got their chance to express their views on the preposterous non-prosecution 
agreement (or the parallel state court resolution of sex crime charges), but 
future crime victims can hopefully be spared a similar fate. 
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APPENDIX: VERSIONS OF THE “NO CAUSE OF ACTION” PROVISION 
S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996); H.J. Res. 173, 104th Cong. (1996); H.J. 
Res. 174, 104th Cong. (1996): 
 
[No provision barring causes of action.] 
 
S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996): 
SECTION 2. The victim shall have standing to assert the rights 
established by this article; however, nothing in this article shall provide 
grounds for the victim to challenge a charging decision or a conviction, 
obtain a stay of trial, or compel a new trial; nor shall anything in this 
article give rise to a claim for damages against the United States, a State, 
a political subdivision, or a public official; nor shall anything in this 
article provide grounds for the accused or convicted offender to obtain 
any form of relief. 
S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997): 
SECTION 2. The victim shall have standing to assert the rights 
established by this article.  However, nothing in this article shall provide 
grounds for the victim to challenge a charging decision or a conviction; 
to obtain a stay of trial; or to compel a new trial.  Nothing in this article 
shall give rise to a claim for damages against the United States, a State, 
a political subdivision, or a public official, nor provide grounds for the 
accused or convicted offender to obtain any form of relief. 
H.J. Res. 71, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997): 
SECTION 2. The victim shall have standing to assert the rights 
established by this article.  However, nothing in this article shall provide 
grounds for the victim to overturn a charging decision, a conviction, or 
a sentence; to obtain a stay of trial; or to compel a new trial.  Nothing in 
this article shall give rise to any claim for damages, nor provide grounds 
for the accused or convicted offender to obtain any form of relief. 
Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment Implementation Act of 1997, 
H.R. 1322, 105th Cong. § 2(c)(4): 
Sec. 2. CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS 
. . . 
(c) REMEDIES. 
. . . 
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(4) JUDICIAL REMEDIES.—This section does not create a cause of 
action or defense in favor of any person arising out of the failure to 
accord to a victim a right provided in subsection (a), and nothing in this 
section— 
(A) provides grounds for the victim to overturn a charging decision, a 
conviction, or a sentence; to obtain a stay of trial; or to compel a new 
trial; or 
(B) provides grounds for the accused or convicted offender to obtain any 
form of relief. 
Proposed Victims’ Rights Act of 1997:260 
SEC. 5. ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF VICTIMS’ 
RIGHTS 
. . . 
(e) NO IMPLIED LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. No provision [or] 
amendment in this Act which does not expressly authorize a cause of 
action or liability for damages sha[ll] be construed to give rise to a cause 
of action or liability for damages against any person or entity. 
S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (introduced): 
SECTION 2. Only the victim or the victim’s representative shall have 
standing to assert the rights established by this article.  Nothing in this 
article shall provide grounds for the victim to challenge a charging 
decision or a conviction; to overturn a sentence or negotiated plea; to 
obtain a stay of trial; or to compel a new trial.  Nothing in this article 
shall give rise to a claim for damages against the United States, a State, 
a political subdivision, or a public official. 
S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (reported): 
SECTION 2. Only the victim or the victim’s lawful representative shall 
have standing to assert the rights established by this article.  Nothing in 
this article shall provide grounds to stay or continue any trial, reopen any 
proceeding or invalidate any ruling, except with respect to conditional 
release or restitution or to provide rights guaranteed by this article in 
future proceedings, without staying or continuing a trial.  Nothing in this 
article shall give rise to or authorize the creation of a claim for damages 
against the United States, a State, a political subdivision, or a public 
officer or employee. 
S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (same). 
 
 260.   Hearing on H.J. Res. 71 and H.R. 1322, supra note 59, at 116. 
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H.J. Res. 64, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (same). 
 
S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002): 
SECTION 3. Nothing in this article shall be construed to provide 
grounds for a new trial or to authorize any claim for damages.  Only the 
victim or the victim’s lawful representative may assert the rights 
established by this article, and no person accused of the crime may obtain 
any form of relief hereunder. 
H.J. Res. 91, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002) (same); 
 
S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003) (same). 
 
S. 2329, 108th Cong. § 3771(d)(6) (2004): 
[(d)](6) NO CAUSE OF ACTION.—Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to authorize a cause of action for damages. 
H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. § 3771(d)(6) (2004): 
[(d)](6) NO CAUSE OF ACTION.—Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to authorize a cause of action for damages or to create, to 
enlarge, or to imply any duty or obligation to any victim or other person 
for the breach of which the United States or any of its officers or 
employees could be held liable in damages.  Nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney 
General or any officer under his direction. 
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, 2263 § 
3771(d)(6) (same); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6) (2018) (same). 
 
